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What is a Significant Educational
Experience?
GEOFFREY HINCHLIFFE
This article analyses the nature of an educational experience
by taking as its starting point Dewey’s Art as Experience in
order to identify what it is that counts as a significant or
worthwhile experience. Dewey suggests that an experience
needs to have an integral character in which the different
phases of the experience are related and which tends towards
a conclusion. Furthermore, an experience also needs to have
the character of what Dewey calls an ‘undergoing’, an
engagement with content which may be difficult or painful. It
is suggested that this kind of experience may be seen in terms
of a ‘light’ pedagogy in which content is allowed to unfold.
This is contrasted with educational experiences that are
‘teacher-driven’ or ‘learner-driven’.
Education is often analysed in terms of process or outcomes. But in this
article I wish to focus on the experience of education from the standpoint
of the child or student who is having the experience. I want to see if there
are characteristics of this experience that can be identified in such a way
that we can say, with reasonable confidence, that the experience was
worthwhile. In particular, I am keen to analyse this experience
independent of results and outcomes, or, in a word, independent of
assessment. This may seem nonsensical to all of those who assume that
formal learning cannot really happen at all unless assessment is built into
the process of learning, but here I want to put this assumption to one side
and just concentrate on the experience itself.1 For even if no assessment
has taken place at all, something has happened nonetheless: an experience
has occurred and the child may even be able to communicate something
of the nature of that experience later on. It may, of course, not
be a particularly memorable or pleasing experience, but something has
happened all the same.
As the article develops I shall try and develop a more philosophical
understanding of what I mean by a significant experience. But for the time
being a few non-philosophical remarks are in order just to fix the starting
point. First, I am referring to a significant or worthwhile experience and
not just any old experience. For example, one may derive great pleasure
from reading a piece by, say, a parliamentary sketch writer; but the
pleasure does not usually extend for long after one has finished; whereas a
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significant experience is one that can be set in the context of life-activities.
Of course there are many degrees of significance and only a few, if any,
experiences will turn out to be, of themselves, life transforming. More
often than not a significant experience takes its place in the context of
activities or practices in which one is engaged and so only affects a part of
one’s life. Moreover, a significant experience does not need to be
remembered over a lifetime: its lessons can be absorbed and brought to
bear on subsequent experiences so though it may be forgotten it may still
possess efficacy.
All this implies that a significant educational experience is one such
that, I suggest, if it is taken outside its educational context, may be
compared to other, non-educational experiences. So a good seminar in
philosophy may be a significant experience in the sense that the long walk
I had last weekend in which I started to notice certain types of birdsong for
the first time was a significant experience; or the lengthy conversation I
had in the pub last night that turned out to be significant because it
disabused me of a prejudice that had started to form in me, hitherto
unnoticed. Of course, most (not all) experiences occur in context so I am
far from asserting that the worthwhile experience is entirely discrete and
context-free. Indeed, without the context, interpretation of the experience
may be virtually meaningless. Nevertheless, we do sometimes consider
different experiences and compare them, despite the fact they each come
with different contexts, and a significant educational experience, I am
suggesting, could be included in this in this kind of informal exercise.
As I have already hinted, an educational experience need not be
significant. It may turn out to have been a very poor one indeed and best
forgotten. Thus dissatisfaction at school is typically characterised by
children in terms of a succession of poor or indifferent experiences, from
their point of view. It may even turn out that although children did indeed
have a memorable experience it had nothing to do with what the teacher
and school had aimed and planned for. In this case, what was undergone
was not so much an indifferent experience but a completely different one
from that intended by the teacher. Whether it was an educational
experience is another question. But it may have been worthwhile and
significant all the same.2
If we suppose, along with R. S. Peters, that the term ‘educational’
implies that ‘something worthwhile has been transmitted’ (or perhaps
developed) which involves knowledge and understanding (see Peters,
1966, pp. 25 and 30), this does not, in itself, imply that the process of
being educated as such has been composed of worthwhile experiences
from the standpoint of the person undergoing that process. It may well be
that both at the time, and also on subsequent reflection, one realises that
very few of one’s educational experiences have been worthwhile.3 A
significant educational experience in the sense I wish to explore is one that
helps to make education as a worthwhile process actually feel worthwhile
as experienced by the child or student.
I am assuming that an educational experience is one that has an
identifiable beginning and an end and qualifies as a single experience
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under some appropriate description. For example, a course, unless it is a
very short, is composed of a number of related experiences but it is always
possible to view the whole course as ‘an experience’. There is an
understandable tendency to make educational experiences fairly short and
sharp (this greatly assists assessment) but many significant experiences
may last days or weeks (as readers of Bleak House will testify). There are,
then, no fixed rules as to how long an experience can last but it must have
some kind of identifiable end point. In practice, of course, the duration of
educational experiences is not only determined by subject matter but by
timetabling constraints and the like.
I will first of all briefly set out two fairly common types of educational
experience: this will more firmly locate the terrain I wish to explore. The
rest of this article will then be spent elaborating the particular type of
experience with which I am concerned.
TWO TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
The first example is taken from the DfES Key Stage 3 National Strategy
document, Pedagogy and Practice (2004). Here I focus on Unit 2:
Teaching Models. If we look at what is termed the ‘deductive teaching
model’ (p. 11) we learn that this is concerned with the teaching of
concepts and specifically with the attributes that a concept possesses,
which must be understood if it is to be distinguished from other, related
concepts. The example given concerns democracy: ‘with a concept of
democracy in a citizenship lesson, the concept rule might be that
‘‘Democracy is government of the people by the people’’’. The document
then outlines for teachers the steps by which these concept rules may be
taught, as follows:
The deductive teaching model has five phases which can be divided into
episodes.
 The teacher begins the lesson with the concept rule, or a statement of
what the pupils will attempt to prove during the lesson.
 The teacher provides some examples which show proof of the
concept rule.
 The teacher, through questioning of the pupils, identifies the critical
attributes and the non-critical attributes which are essential and non-
essential characteristics of the concept.
 The teacher follows this by showing examples and non-examples of
the same concept to the pupils.
 The pupils must categorise the examples or non-examples (those
which do not show essential characteristics of the concept rule) by
explaining why they do or do not fit the concept rule being discussed
(DfES, 2004, Teaching Models, Unit 2, p. 11).
Now, in many ways it is difficult to quarrel too much with this approach.
It is systematic and purposeful. The process is allied to the objectives of
the lesson. It is interactive and space is given for student activity. Yet
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despite all these merits, not least of which is that there is a sporting chance
that the concept rule will be understood, we might feel a certain unease. For
one thing, the entire process is directed—indeed, controlled—by the teacher.
There seems little room for a student voice which has not already been
sanctioned within the process. There also seems little chance of exploring the
concept in such a way that relates to student or child experience (though
much depends here on the kind of examples used). There is little or no
chance of what might be termed ‘creative deviancy’—note that the ‘pupils
must categorise the examples by explaining why they do or do not fit’. The
lesson seems to read as a series of tasks to be accomplished. To be sure, the
tasks are thought through and relate to the objectives but it is not clear that
there is any space here for any enjoyment or fun: there seems little
opportunity to relax in this lesson. Right from the start, the teacher has an
agenda to drive through—and everyone must play their part.
Now, I do not deny for one moment that such a lesson could turn out to
be enjoyable: much here would depend on the teacher style, the rapport
she has with the class and the richness of the examples discussed.
Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the children, this experience is
essentially teacher-driven. I would also say, in parenthesis, that if a
teacher taught like this for each lesson every day he or she would probably
end up completely exhausted before the end of the school week.
For the second type of educational experience, I take as my example
The Art of Constructivist Teaching in the Primary School by Nick Selley
(1999). Here we are told, in no uncertain terms that, in contrast to
orthodox transmission pedagogies, the constructivist approach allows that
‘the learner always controls the sense she makes of an experience’.
However, what may seem to be a highly questionable epistemological
stance (namely rampant subjectivism) is modified through the additional
requirement that constructions and interpretations be validated: ‘. . . you
are helping the child to build up the best version of his/her model and to
test it against experience’ (1999, p. 24). This is achieved through
conversation, questioning and investigation. However, as Selley himself
concedes, the business of ‘trying out one’s own ideas’ is not easy:
scientific investigation, for example, requires that the student ‘must know
what the question is, must want to find a solution, must know a promising
line of procedure, must know how to set up and manipulate the necessary
apparatus and must expect to be allowed to extract meaning from the
results’. And presumably, the more any of this is lacking the greater the
teacher intervention is required. Constructivism seems to place a
considerable burden and responsibility on the child. What one might
term a child- or student-driven educational experience is not so much the
having of an experience but the directing and managing of it. This looks
difficult, by any standards, because it seems to involve not only an activity
but also the meta-activity by the child of monitoring, recording and
communicating what is going on in the primary activity.
So, for example, in the constructivist teaching of history, the child must
be able to demonstrate the construction or interpretation of evidence
through ‘a talk, a diagram, role play or a drawing . . . by examining this
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representation we are able to assess the validity or fairness of the
construction regarding the available visible evidence of the past’
(Copeland, 1998, p. 125). What concerns me here is not so much that
these constructions may not be historically accurate: after all the historical
understanding of the child is bound to be simplified or abbreviated and any
serious misconceptions can always be corrected. It is that so much is
expected of the child: just as the teacher ends up exhausted after intense
teacher-driven learning, so it seems to me that children will end up burnt-
out before the end of the week if they are subjected to a series of non-stop
constructivist exercises across the curriculum.
Nevertheless, both these types of educational experience seem to me to
have their place in any pedagogy. There will be times when a teacher-
driven approach is called for: for example, if it is felt that certain basic
concepts have to be understood before any further progress can be made.
There will be other times when a more constructivist approach seems
appropriate because this gives the child the space and time to design and
construct their own learning in their own way and at their own pace. But I
now wish to explore a different type of experience which is neither teacher
nor child nor learner-driven.
DEWEY’S CONCEPT OF AN EXPERIENCE
Instead of turning to John Dewey’s works on education, I wish to examine
his concept of aesthetic experience. He did not write on this systematically
until the early 1930s when he was in his seventies. His working
assumption is that aesthetic experiences are not special events that only
happen to certain highly sensitive individuals in particular circumstances,
but are much more widespread. This assumption is made good by the
analysis of experience that he provides in Art as Experience (1934). He is
concerned, initially, in this important book, to distinguish those
experiences with little connection with each other and which prompt
opposing emotions and reflections from what he calls ‘an experience’.
Here, he says, ‘the material experienced runs its course to fulfilment’
(Dewy, 1934, p. 35) and only then is it identified and integrated within the
general stream of experience. He puts this point more cogently as follows:
‘Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualising
quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience’ (p. 35). Dewey’s concern,
then, is to try and say how we have an aesthetic experience by pointing out
that although there may be a succession of events or experiences
nevertheless there is a unity whilst at the same time the self-identity of
each part is maintained. There is a ‘flow’, the sense of which he tries to
capture through the word ‘phases’, and he contrasts this with Locke and
Hume’s analysis of experience in terms of impressions and ideas which
are discrete and separate. The idea of ‘phases’ is that an experience may
be composed of emotions, thoughts and activities which have a connection
and continuity (though that connection may itself need to be explored and
unfolded). This flow culminates in a consummation of a movement—a
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conclusion—which implies that the full meaning of an experience can
only be grasped if the experience has also been undergone in all its phases.
Dewey goes on to say that a quality pervades the experience which he
characterises in terms of a property: ‘we may find that one property rather
than another was sufficiently dominant so that it characterises the
experience as a whole’ (p. 37).
We can, I think, readily recognise this description as one that
approximates to experiencing a work of art. Thus, we might say that
Guernica conveys a certain quality of experience which is quite different
from, say, Monet’s different versions of Water Lilies, painted when he lived
at Giverny. However, Dewey wishes to extend this thought to claiming that,
for example, thinking has a certain aesthetic quality when it takes the form of
a movement of an idea, a ‘movement of anticipation and cumulation, one
that finally comes to completion . . . and has a satisfying emotional quality
because it possesses internal integration and fulfilment reached through
ordered and organised movement’ (p. 38). With ‘an’ experience it is the
whole process that is experienced and not just the outcome. Thus moral
actions need not be experienced solely on the plane of duty but may also
have an aesthetic character when they have a unity reaching a conclusion.
Dewey maintains that the enemies of the aesthetic are neither the practical
nor the intellectual, but the ‘humdrum . . . and submission to convention . . .
both coerced submission and slackness of loose ends are deviations in
opposite directions from the unity of an experience’ (p. 40). He is suggesting,
then, that the aesthetic is an integral experience and that this type of
experience is by no means confined to the conventionally aesthetic.
Dewey goes on to identify further elements that characterise this
integral experience. First, he states that struggle and conflict may be
enjoyed as a feature of developing an experience: it is not necessary for
the experience to be passive, as when one surveys works of art in a
museum. He develops this idea further by suggesting that for any integral
experience there is an element of ‘undergoing’, of suffering even: this
ensues because an experience involves taking in something and may be
‘more than placing something on the top of consciousness over what was
previously known. It involves reconstruction which may be painful’ (p.
41). An integral experience therefore requires an engagement with
materials, ideas or processes and cannot be unduly hurried because there is
a time appropriate to its unfolding. It cannot be cut up or divided into
small parts or ‘chunks’ without compromising its unity. It cannot be
appropriated, directed or managed without the risk of directly under-
mining the very quality that constitutes the experience’s particular value.
Whether this appropriation be by somebody else (e.g. a teacher) or oneself
(in the capacity of someone keen to manage their own learning) something
of the experience may be lost because it has not been properly
‘undergone’. There is a balance to be struck between doing and
undergoing, a balance too often neglected in favour of doing:
Zeal for doing, lust for action, leaves many a person, especially in this
hurried and impatient human environment in which we live, with
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experience of an almost incredible paucity, all on the surface. No one
experience has a chance to complete itself because something else is
entered upon so speedily. What is called experience becomes so dispersed
and miscellaneous as hardly to deserve the name. Resistance is treated as
an obstruction to be beaten down, not as an invitation to reflection. An
individual comes to seek, unconsciously even more than by deliberate
choice, situations in which he can do the most things in the shortest time
(Dewey, 1934, p. 45).
We are only too familiar with this lament. Perhaps what Dewey could
have never appreciated back in 1934 is the way that experiences today
may also contain a complete absence of ‘doing’ to the point where
experience is one of sheer passivity, hours on end, evening after evening.
Although maybe if we have spent much of the day lusting for action, this
is only to be expected.
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s thoughts on the nature of experience (Erlebnis)
are uncannily similar to those of Dewey, to the point where almost the
same expressions are being used to convey meaning. Gadamer (1975/
1989) commences his analysis with a historical overview of the meaning
of Erlebnis, concluding that in Enlightenment Germany the word
conveyed three senses at once: immediacy of experience, the idea that
an experience makes a particular impression that gives lasting importance
and that it does this through achieving a permanence that emerges out of
the transiency of experience. Out of this romantic critique of rationalism
emerged, according to Gadamer, a concept of experience which Dilthey
employed in order to capture ‘the special nature of the given in the human
sciences’ (Gadamer, 1975/1989, p. 65). But these units of experience are
now philosophically transformed so that they become units of meaning
which are intentional:
If something is called or considered an Erlebnis, that means it is rounded
into the unity of a significant whole . . . an experience is no longer just
something that flows past quickly in the stream of conscious life; it is
meant as a unity and thus attains a new mode of being one (p. 66).
And a little later, Gadamer alludes to the idea of an experience as an
adventure (in contrast with episodes which are a ‘succession of details
which have no inner coherence and for that reason have no permanent
significance’ [p. 69]) which must be ‘undergone like a test or a trial from
which one emerges more enriched, more mature’. Gadamer goes on to
suggest that such an experience is taken out of the continuity of life and
related to the ‘whole of one’s life’. For on the one hand there is the
‘experiencing’ in its immediacy and vitality but there is also the
experience once it has been integrated into one’s life so that its
significance may go beyond the meaning it had whilst it was in the
process of being undergone.
Thus Gadamer adds something to Dewey’s account. First of all, he
stresses that an experience is fused with the experience of life itself and so
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the meaning of a single experience is never completely exhausted through
conceptual determination: the meaning of an experience may always be
revised at some point. Gadamer suggests that some experiences are not
only not easily forgotten but also that they may take some time to
assimilate, with the implication that this assimilation may never be
complete even if one thinks it is. Second, having an experience—once we
think of it as a kind of adventure—can be a risky business: it takes us out
into the uncertain. But these observations are, I think, implicit in Dewey’s
account: the very fact that we undergo an experience suggests that it is
something that is never completely under our control.
THE NATURE OF AN EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
I now wish to further explore the nature of the kind of educational
experience that Dewey’s reflections on aesthetic experience allows us to
identify. In the following section I will make some brief remarks on
pedagogy and in the final section I will pick up Gadamer’s thoughts on
how educational experience can be related to one’s ‘whole life’.
There are many different types of educational experience but rather than
enumerate some kind of discipline-based taxonomy I will look to see what
three philosophers suggest: Wittgenstein, Grice and Oakeshott.
As Andrea English has recently pointed out, a central feature of learning
is, or ought to be, its transformative quality (English, 2009). But how does
this work? One way of approaching this problem is through Wittgenstein’s
discussion of ‘seeing-as’ in Philosophical Investigations. He supposes
that:
I may contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another.
I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this
experience ‘noticing an aspect’ (1958, IIxi, p. 212).
A little later (p. 213) he distinguishes ‘continuous seeing’ from the
‘dawning’ of an aspect. Wittgenstein’s point is that we are not given raw
material that we then somehow interpret and derive a meaning: rather the
perceptual grasp is also an interpretive one too—hence the aptness of the
example of the duck-rabbit where what is seen (the perceptual data) does not
change. It is also clear from his analysis that the duck-rabbit is for him a
fairly primitive example, for an aspect may dawn where states of affairs are
more complex: ‘what I perceive in the dawning of an aspect is not a property
of the object, but an internal relation between it and other objects’ (p. 212).
I want to suggest that one of the ways in which learning transforms is
just this: the dawning of an aspect. I have in mind times when an inchoate
jumble of information starts to make sense as an ‘aspect’ dawns on us; or
perhaps the same information was seen in terms of a,b,c but is now seen in
terms of x,y,z. It might be objected that aspect-dawning is a part of
learning but only a small part: in particular what Wittgenstein describes
are situations where a person is simply looking and pondering. Yet when a
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teacher does step out of a teacher-driven pedagogy and lets learning
happen maybe aspect-dawning is exactly what needs to take place. But for
aspects to dawn there are 3 preconditions: first, there needs to be enough
time, with breaks for chatting if needs be. Second, the pace mustn’t be
forced at the same tempo; intensive activity needs to be followed by slow
reflection. And third, the subject under consideration must be self-
contained—a poem, a problem, a short text—so that in the time available
it becomes possible for the learning to make sense. Aspects don’t dawn by
trying too hard or by trying to do too much.
Interestingly, Wittgenstein is aware that aspect-dawning may require
‘someone capable of making certain applications . . . quite freely. The
substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique’ (p. 208) and
he goes on to surmise that here we have a ‘different though related
concept’ to that of visual aspect-dawning. And here, I want to suggest that
skills are brought to fruition precisely at the point where they enable a new
aspect to dawn. For example, students learning to think philosophically
may start to see how concepts are linked: their tutor may tell them many
times how rationality and freedom are linked in Kant but it may take the
explorations of personal or situated case studies for students to realise this.
For the second type of experience I turn to an argument by Paul Grice,
sometimes called the ‘communication-intention’ theory of meaning.
However, my interest is more in the concept of recognition:
A must intend to induce by x a belief in an audience, and he must also
intend his utterance to be recognised as so intended. But these intentions
are not independent; the recognition is intended by A to play its part in
inducing the belief, and if it does not do so something will have gone
wrong with the fulfilment of A’s intentions (Grice, 1957, pp. 383-4).
Something like Grice’s theory of communication-intention is needed to
underpin what can happen between tutor and student in terms of a dialectic
of recognition. What is particularly important is that the recognition take
the form of an understanding: it is not the mere perlocutionary effect of a
discourse instrumentally designed and fashioned to achieve certain
outcomes. Still less is it a type of behaviour that works in the stimulus-
response mode which would not be action at all.
In what might be called normal teaching, the teacher may give
instructions or give explanations in which the meaning of terms used is not
an issue: the teacher is not attempting to induce any new or different
beliefs from what she may standardly expect in a given situation. But there
may be times of ‘transformative’ teaching in which the teacher is trying to
induce a belief precisely by intending this to be recognised by the child or
student. An example is where the teacher is trying to elicit different modes
of behaviour on the part of the child in terms of interaction with other
children. Or a university lecturer has reached a decisive point in an
argument in which an example is used to help induce new beliefs. What is
happening in both cases is that an experience is being created through the
dialectic of recognition which depends not only on the teacher’s intentions
What is a Significant Educational Experience? 425
r 2011 The Author
Journal compilation r 2011 Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain
being recognised but also by the way in which the teacher intends this
recognition to take place. And this discourse may be accompanied by a
range of non-visual signs all of which have an illocutionary effect. Grice’s
theory of meaning, then, helps us to identify a non-strategic method of
teaching which we could refer to as the ‘communication-intention’ style of
teaching. And through style and context an experience is created which
has all the more power for being shared by teacher and child alike.
My third example of educational experience is taken from Michael
Oakeshott in his discussion of human agency in his book On Human
Conduct. One mode of agency he terms ‘self-disclosure’ and it arises in
the pursuit of aims, purposes and outcomes. Oakeshott describes it as
follows:
Self-disclosure is in transactions with others and it is a hazardous
adventure; it is immersed in contingency, it is interminable, and it is liable
to frustration, disappointment and defeat . . . an agent’s choice is a
response to an understood contingent situation and is therefore infected
with contingency, and becoming a performance it falls into the hands of
other optative agents who may defeat it and will certainly compromise it.
And even if what survives bears some relation to the meaning of the act, it
may disappoint and it will certainly reveal itself as but another situation to
be diagnosed and responded to (Oakeshott, 1975, p. 73).
My thought here is that of the classroom or seminar room as a scene of
self-disclosure in terms of the risks taken in exposing one’s beliefs for
public scrutiny. A few years ago in an adult education class in philosophy
I was attempting to ‘induce’ in students certain beliefs about Kierke-
gaardian despair. The problem was not the despair—they all recognised
angst when they saw it. The problem was understanding the idea of
despair before God for persons of a secular, or at least semi-secular
disposition. Our perplexity was only broached when we started to talk
about the idea of surrendering yourself before God—what could this
mean? One student then recounted his conversations with alcoholics in an
AA group and the idea that when you reach rock bottom you admit defeat
and surrender yourself, as the first stage of your recovery. Though these
different kinds of self-disclosure—the person who revealed his close
contact with alcoholics, those who insisted on maintaining their secularity,
others who were half-baked and even one or two who, in the end,
professed their Christianity—we were able to reach a better understanding
of Kierkegaard. Those students risked revealing something about
themselves as part of the process of learning about a particular concept
of despair.
As I have mentioned, there can be no taxonomy of educational
experience and the examples of aspect-dawning, recognition and self-
disclosure are far from exhaustive. An educational experience often occurs
in company with others but this is by no means necessary. Moreover,
teachers may not even always be aware that any experience of educational
significance has happened at all, at least at the time. They may have arisen
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through the normal interaction of the seminar or classroom without having
been planned.
A PEDAGOGY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE?
I now wish to address briefly the question as to how teachers can bring
about an educational experience, assuming that readers so far acknowl-
edge their value. Can these experiences be brought about through a
systematic pedagogy?
Some of the ideas discussed here have been considered by Nigel Tubbs
in his ‘Philosophy of the Teacher’ (2005), especially in the section entitled
‘The Spiritual Teacher’. For example, it would seem that closely aligned
to Dewey’s idea of ‘undergoing’ is the idea of attentiveness put forward
by Simone Weil, discussed by Tubbs. Weil says:
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty
and ready to be penetrated by the object . . . our thought should be empty,
waiting, not seeking anything but ready to receive in its naked truth the
object which is ready to penetrate it (Weil, 1977, p. 56).
It is impossible not to be moved by Weil’s plea for attentiveness especially
in the way she couples this with the need for the effacement of the ego if
learning is to have a lasting place. Yet we also should be aware that for
Weil attentiveness is a means through which we can establish a closer
relation with God through prayer. The subject matter itself, she insists, is
of no account: learning through close attention is how we prepare
ourselves for prayer. And although I am very far indeed from disparaging
Weil’s broader aim it is not the one being put forward here. Certainly an
‘undergoing’ implies that the teacher encourages attentiveness but the
purpose of this is to promote educational experience through an encounter
with content, and not the value of attentiveness for its own sake.
A similar thought is prompted by Tubbs’ discussion of Heidegger,
especially the well-known passage in ‘What Calls for Thinking?’. There,
Heidegger suggests that ‘the proper teacher lets nothing else be learned
than learning’ (Heidegger, 1977, p. 356). But in the paragraph straight
after the one where he discusses learning, Heidegger reverts to his central
theme, that of thinking—‘we are trying to learn thinking’—and finishes
his paper by re-iterating that thinking is ‘our essential destiny’, so that
what calls for thinking ‘appropriates us to thought’. But again, whatever
the merits of the primacy given to thinking by Heidegger, that is not my
theme in the exploration of educational experience. Far from wishing to
efface the self of the learner in the face of either God or philosophy, I am
exploring ways in which the experience of the self can be enriched
through engagement with educational content, much of which will not
include philosophy. And as my examples have made clear, I hope, a
significant educational experience need not exclude the teacher. ‘Letting
learning happen’ need not imply that learning is an isolated activity and
for that reason alone (for most young people) joyless.
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Between teacher-driven learning and standing back to ‘let learning
happen’ is a difficult position to be in. What we need is not ‘no’ pedagogy
but a lot less of it—a ‘poor pedagogy’, perhaps. This idea has been
suggested by Jan Masschelein who takes up Walter Benjamin’s suggestion
of learning as ‘walking’, the idea being that the student (and this could
include any one who counts themselves a student of learning) opens
themselves to what is around them:
The point about walking is not that it would offer us a ‘better’ view . . . a
more complete view . . . but that it offers us a look that transforms whilst
its evidence commands us (Masschelein, 2010, p. 45).
He goes on to commend pedagogies that do not put the student under
surveillance and do not monitor (p. 50). Something like a poor pedagogy
is needed to bring about educational experiences that are worthwhile.
Pedagogies rich in method and outcomes may detract from the quality of
the experience, which is why I cannot offer a set of methods and
procedures in order to bring about richer experience. It depends on
responding to the content of what is taught through establishing relations
with children and students in which, in a background of trust, self-
disclosure and recognition are more likely to occur.
The metaphor of walking explored by Masschelein may start to open up
what counts as an educational experience. I have in mind here the many
experiences that one may have at school:
When we say that learning is not the only purpose of schooling, we do not
have to invent activities demonstrably devoid of learning and show they
are somehow valuable. All we have to do is to point to activities that we
think are worthwhile and that we would continue to promote even if we
could not state what children are learning from them. In my first year of
teaching, I helped my students put on a Christmas play, supervised their
operation of a school newspaper, read my favourite stories to them,
advised them as they organised socials . . . they enjoyed what they were
doing, shared their knowledge, expressed themselves . . . and in general
grew as competent, caring lovable people (Noddings, 1993, p. 735).
Noddings goes on to make a broader point that excellence can take many
forms and there is no point in compelling children and students to
undertake subjects for which they have no liking or aptitude. Those of a
‘mechanical’ bent, for example, ‘would follow programs in which these
interests would be allowed full play . . . its students could invent,
construct, repair and maintain machinery . . . the list is endless’ (p. 740).
Noddings can be interpreted as saying that a school environment can
provide a wide range of valuable experiences. In my terms, these
experiences will often be of an integral variety—they will have a unity,
there will be a sense of ‘undergoing’ and the experience may have a
greater significance than the bare experiencing once it is integrated,
through reflection, into a self-narrative.
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I have drawn on Dewey’s concept of aesthetic experience in order to
elaborate what amounts to a significant educational experience, namely
one that is worthwhile. Dewey has helped us to identify what might be
called its formal characteristics—that the experience is integral and has a
unity and is experienced as an undergoing. In addition to Dewey, Gadamer
has helped us to see that what is experienced is at the level of meaning
(although part of what is ‘undergone’ may involve tactile or auditory
experience). This kind of experience may be actualised in many different
ways, although I suspect that the three examples I have given in the
previous section may be representative. First, the idea of an aspect
dawning—when material is grasped as such and such—may be a solitary
experience for which classroom activity was preparatory. So I am not
suggesting that teachers need to go around seeing to it that aspects dawn.
Indeed, too much organisation of material on the part of the teacher may
prevent any real experience of aspect-dawning at all and actually deprive
the pupil of the pleasure of seeing an aspect actually dawn on one. In the
second example, the idea of recognition clearly does rely on interaction.
But note that this interaction is not the mere recognition of an instruction
or an order: it is the intentional grasp of material that is shared between
teacher and pupil and the implicit recognition by the teacher of the pupil’s
having grasped it and, at the same time, the understanding by the pupil
that the teacher knows that he (the pupil) has grasped it. It is one of those
Eureka moments. They can often come about when a pupil or student
manages to make a connection or link with material that is clearly related
but has not been explicitly mentioned thus far. But in making the
connection the pupil is in fact forging a unity between what had hitherto
been regarded as disparate material. In the third example, the experience is
clearly one of interaction through dialogue. But note that the educational
experience here is not the mere swapping of ideas (still less is it
‘brainstorming’ which negates the very possibility of a unity). It is a
conversation that builds on what has gone before so that the conclusion is
reached through a cumulative effect. What is happening here is that the
unity is actually forged by the participants themselves—even if the
conclusion reached is inconclusive (rather like some of Plato’s dialogues).
It is not that the participants themselves have formed a unity (though this
may be one of the beneficial side-effects of the dialogue) but that the
dialogue, if successful, has enabled an integral experience of subject
matter at the level of meaning to emerge. And again, rather as in the case
of the other two examples, the role of the teacher or tutor must be low-key
and never dominant.
EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND SELF-FORMATION
In this final section I wish to explore Gadamer’s idea that certain kinds of
experience can be integrated into a whole life. What is needed here is
some idea of how this can be achieved from the agent’s perspective.
Charles Taylor has helped us considerably in providing a framework
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through the contrast of a strong and weak evaluator (see Taylor, 1985
passim, but especially Chapter 1 for an introduction to the concept of
strong evaluation). Taylor explains that ‘weak evaluation’ is only
concerned with the evaluation of the best means to attain pre-given ends
(e.g. ends delivered through desires) whereas strong evaluation seeks to
shape and modify existing ends. I am particularly interested in the role
strong/weak evaluation plays in fashioning self-identity.
What would a weak evaluator look like in educational terms? It would
surely be someone who viewed their education in an instrumental way in
which the actual educational experiences were to be blotted out once the
appropriate qualification had been obtained. Such a person may have been
a good student but their experiences in learning are discounted in terms of
their meaning for him or her. Perhaps the weak evaluator sees herself as a
strict pragmatist and rather glories in what seems to her a rather fine
destiny. Certainly, assessment-driven pedagogies do nothing to discourage
such a perspective.
What would a strong evaluator look like? It would be someone who was
trying to forge a self-identity in which educational experiences play a part,
perhaps a major one, in a life. He would use these experiences to try and
work out what kind of values were important in terms of his own
motivation. Possibly it might be in terms of ‘chemist’ or ‘historian’ or
‘engineer’; in this case identity would be fashioned through the
disciplines. But stronger candidates for thinking about identity might be
a continuum running from creativity and the practical through to the
reflective: the agent may think of himself as ‘creative’, or ‘practical’, or
perhaps ‘intellectual’. What I am suggesting is that individual educational
experiences take on a more influential role when adopted by a person
trying to test a possible identity against experience or using an experience
to strengthen an identity. This would mean that part of what a ‘poor’ or
‘light’ pedagogy involves is encouraging children and students to find and
strengthen their identities as strong evaluators using educational
experiences as a way of doing this.
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NOTES
1. The following assumption, in a paper surveying assessment methods in Higher Education is
typical: ‘If you want to change student learning then change the methods of assessment’ (Brown
et al., 1997, p. 9). In this article I wish to suggest the priority of the quality of the learning
experience.
2. For example, Paul Willis (1977) shows how ‘having a laugh’ at the teacher’s expense,
experienced by teenagers at a working class urban school helps to promote a certain
independence and solidarity, quite independent of any curriculum aims.
3. Winston Churchill’s encounter with education is a case in point. Here he is in reflecting on his
early life, in his 50s—10 years before becoming Prime Minister:
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It was at the ‘Little Lodge’ I was first menaced with Education. The approach of a sinister
figure described as ‘the Governess’ was announced. Her arrival was fixed for a certain day. In
order to prepare for this day, Mrs Everest [his nanny] produced a book called Reading Without
Tears. It certainly did not justify its title in my case. I was made aware that before the
Governess arrived I must be able to read without tears. We toiled each day. My nurse pointed
with a pen at the different letters. I thought it all very tiresome. Our preparations were by
no means completed when the fateful hour struck and the Governess was due to arrive. I did
what so many oppressed peoples have done in similar circumstances: I took to the woods
(Churchill, 1930, p.11).
Later on, Churchill summarises his Harrow experience thus:
But this interlude of school makes a sombre grey patch upon the chart of my journey. It was
an unending spell of worries that did not then seem petty, and of toil uncheered by fruition; a
time of discomfort, restriction and purposeless monotony (p. 46).
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